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Taking the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) as archetypes, a psychiatric diagnosis primarily 
lists symptoms and signs of people whom it purports to describe. It may also list additional 
factors such as how the condition develops over time, prevalence figures, causal factors and 
gender differences. In this paper I focus on the behavioural aspects of psychiatric diagnosis. 
There is a long history of concern over psychiatric diagnosis. Some critics consider 
psychiatric diagnosis as arbitrary or as a means of pathologising people with only minor 
problems. They sometimes argue that, in contrast to typical pictures of science as providing 
descriptions of how the world actually is, psychiatric diagnosis have been invented, created 
or constructed by psychiatrists. This is important because psychiatric diagnoses can influence 
decisions over treatment and over compulsory detentions. Being diagnosed can influence an 
individual's self-perception and their relationship to others. Psychiatric diagnoses being 
somehow false or untrue would raise serious questions over how much they should influence 
clinical decision making. I will provide an overview of arguments for and against psychiatric 
diagnosis meriting belief through exploring notions of realism and anti-realism present in 
analytical philosophy of science and philosophy of psychiatry. 
 Questions of realism are about whether our beliefs accurately describe the world. To 
the degree that our beliefs accurately describe the world, realism is justified. To the degree 
that our beliefs do not accurately describe the world, then, a form of anti-realism is justified. 
For example, most people are realists about tables. When most people speak about or use 
tables it seems there is something which exists. In contrast, most people are anti-realists about 
unicorns. These are typically understood as being imaginary. They are something we have 
created or constructed in our minds.  
 This chapters focuses on a particular type of realism, scientific realism.1 This topic 
focuses on the questions about the realism or anti-realism of scientific concepts. The central 
issue of the scientific realism debate is whether scientific theories correctly or very nearly 
correctly describe the world. Most people generally believe that what scientists describe 
actually exists. Some philosophers, known as scientific realists, share these views. Other 
philosophers are scientific anti-realists. They commonly point out that there have been many 
scientific theories which scientists believed in, sometimes on very good evidence, yet those 
theories were mistaken in many of their central claims. Despite making incredibly successful 
predictions many past abandoned theories postulated things which turned out to actually not 
actually exist. A scientific anti-realist, Larry Laudan, lists many theories which scientists 
once believed in, but which turned out to be mistaken in central details about what exists in 
the world: 
 
                                                          
1 Philosophers of psychiatry typically see psychiatric diagnoses as entities rather than scientific theories. Some 
scientific realists, known as entity realists, also see scientific realism as focusing on entities rather than 
theories. However, most scientific realist typically focus upon scientific theories because they believe 
entities can only be established through scientific theories. I believe this is the case with psychiatric 
diagnoses (see sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this article). Consequently I shall focus upon typical notions of 
scientific realism and its emphasis on theories. 
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“-the crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy; 
-the humoral theory of medicine; 
-the effluvial theory of static electricity; 
-'catastrophist' geology, with its commitment to a universal (Noachian) deluge; 
-the phlogiston theory of chemistry; 
-the caloric theory of heat; 
-the vibratory theory of heat; 
-the vital force theories of physiology; 
-the electromagnetic aether; 
-the optical aether”.2 
 
The realist and anti-realist debate thus aims to establish whether modern scientific theories 
are similarly mistaken in central claims about what things exist in the world, questioning if 
things like electrons and tectonic plates actually exist or if they are mistaken in a similar 
manner to old, abandoned scientific theories. The history of psychiatry also includes many 
long-abandoned psychiatric diagnoses such as hysteria, monomania, childhood 
schizophrenia, neurasthenia, draeptomania, simple schizophrenia and symbiotic psychosis, 
raising such anti-realist concerns towards psychiatric diagnosis.3 
 Scientific realist Stathis Psillos outlines scientific realism as having two aspects, both 
of which must be met for a scientific theory to merit belief. Failure to meet either of them 
results in anti-realism, whereby a scientific theory does not merit belief. These aspects are 
metaphysical realism and epistemic realism. Metaphysical realism focuses on questions about 
what exists. Epistemic realism focuses on questions about how much we know about what 
exists. The remainder of this chapter firstly considers arguments for and against metaphysical 
realism in psychiatry. That is, what part, if any, of the real world could psychiatric diagnosis 
describe? Then the chapter secondly considers arguments for and against epistemic realism in 
psychiatry. That is, how reliable are psychiatric diagnosis for describing what exists in the 
parts of the world psychiatry investigates?4 
 
 
2.0 Metaphysical realism and anti-realism 
 
Scientific realism involves “The Metaphysical Thesis: The world has a definite and mind-
independent structure”.5 A metaphysical realist thinks the world has a mind-independent 
structure which will be in principle knowable. The world has a particular form independent of 
                                                          
2 Larry Laudan, 'A Confutation of Convergent Realism', Philosophy of Science 48, no.1 (1981): 33. 
3 Note that historians and historically inclined philosophers often disagree over the degree to which abandoned 
scientific theories and abandoned psychiatric diagnosis actually were mistaken; these are examples of 
problematic cases. 
4 There is also “The Semantic Thesis: Scientific theories should be taken at face value... they are capable of 
being true or false”, Stathis Psillos,'The Present State of the Scientific Realism Debate', in Knowing the 
Structure of Nature: Essays on Realism and Explanation, ed. Sathis Psillos (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), 4 emphasis original. I shall not discuss this because semantic anti-realism is generally 
rejected by modern philosophy of science. “Semantic realism is not contested anymore”, Ibid, 5 with even 
leading anti-realists philosophers of science being semantic realists. 
5 Ibid, 4 emphasis original. 
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our views about it. It exists in a particular way, and there are facts about the way the world 
exists, regardless of how we think the world is. Metaphysical realists see the mind-
independent structure of the world as what is real, as what scientific theories try to literally 
describe. In contrast, metaphysical anti-realism is where particular facts about the nature of 
the world are only present after human conventions are in place. A metaphysical anti-realist 
denies there is a mind-independent structure. Astrology is a fairly uncontroversial example of 
something which philosophers would adopt metaphysical anti-realism towards. Astrology 
makes claims that things like the positions of the planets can influence the interpersonal 
relationships of humans. If the actual metaphysical structure of the world is one in which the 
position of the planets does not affect human interpersonal relationships, then astrology does 
not study the metaphysical structure of the world. Astrology attempts to describe something 
which has no metaphysical structure so the relationships posited by astrology describe 
nothing real. 
 Metaphysical realism and anti-realism are often domain specific. Someone might 
think there are true facts about the nature of the world in parts of the world studied by some 
sciences but not in areas studied by other sciences. Some examples highlight how 
philosophers could be metaphysical realist about some scientific claims but be a metaphysical 
anti-realist over other claims. A philosopher might believe there are mind-independent facts 
about atoms in physics and cells in biology but not about organisms. For a second example, a 
philosopher might deny that there are mind-independent facts about economic activities of 
nations. There might be facts about people, geographic locations and exchange of money but 
not about nations. A metaphysical anti-realist might claim nations are arbitrary groups, in that 
it is purely human conventions which decide where the boundaries between Germany and 
France are. There are no mind-independent facts about economic activities of nations because 
which nations there are is purely a matter of arbitrary human conventions. Thus a 
metaphysical anti-realist about psychiatric diagnosis does not believe that nothing exists. 
Rather, they might be metaphysical realists about many different scientific claims but not 
over psychiatric diagnosis. 
 The central question here is whether there is any part of the metaphysical structure of 
the world which psychiatric diagnosis might describe. The alternative is that, like with 
astrology, psychiatric diagnosis are things which humans have created and that do not 
describe the real world. I shall now outline metaphysical realism over psychiatric diagnosis 
then I shall discuss arguments for metaphysical anti-realism over psychiatric diagnosis.  
 A metaphysical realist over psychiatric diagnosis will think that the symptoms 
(thoughts, feelings and behaviour) exhibited by patients is part of the mind-independent 
structure. Alternatively, the metaphysical realist over psychiatric diagnosis will think that 
those symptoms (thoughts, feelings and behaviour) is caused by the mind-independent 
structure of the world. A metaphysical anti-realist will deny these claims. The most 
commonly employed notion of metaphysical realism in psychiatry is that of “natural kinds”. 
These are typically thought of as natural divisions in the world which form due to real causes. 
Since “membership in a natural kind depends on the common basis that holds the kind 
together, we have a ready solution to the problem of why patients who meet the diagnosis 
share a set of symptoms, viz. that they are all undergoing the same processes and the 
symptoms are effects of those processes”.6 On this account, individuals with the same 
underlying physiological characteristics will exhibit the same behaviour. The same causes in 
                                                          
6 Dominic Murphy, 'Natural Kinds in Folk Psychology and in Psychiatry', in Classifying Psychopathology, 
eds. Harold Kincaid and Jacqueline A Sullivan (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2014), 106. 
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the metaphysical structure of the world are present in each individual with the diagnosis. 
Therefore, a psychiatric diagnosis would merit belief if it correctly described that behaviour. 
There are, however, many different approaches to natural kinds. I will firstly outline four 
different accounts of kinds in psychiatry, as presented by Nick Haslam. Then, I will assess in 
what manner each one is or is not realist. 
 Firstly, Haslam outlines essentialist natural kinds where a “specific, causally 
efficacious pathological process, mechanism or structure is present”.7 This is essentialist 
because the underlying cause is present for everyone with that illness and absent in those 
without. Also, essentialist natural kinds have clear boundaries. Someone either has that 
psychiatric diagnosis or they do not; no one partially has the diagnosis. Secondly, Haslam 
outlines discrete kinds, which also have clear boundaries, meaning someone cannot partly 
meet the diagnostic criteria. However, discrete kinds differ from essentialist natural kinds 
because discrete kinds do not have essentialist causes.8 On this account, multiple different 
causes can come together to produce a discrete set of symptoms; there is no need for one 
single cause to be present. Thirdly, Haslam outlines fuzzy kinds which lack the discrete 
boundaries of discrete kinds. There is no sharp natural demarcation between where the fuzzy 
kind starts and ends. Whilst there is a difference between some individuals with fuzzy kinds 
and some individuals who lack that fuzzy kind, there are also cases where individuals have 
only some of the symptoms of the psychiatric diagnosis so partly have the fuzzy kind and 
partly do not.9 Additionally, they also lack essentialist causes. Finally, Haslam outlines 
practical kinds whereby there is no boundary in the world between those with the psychiatric 
diagnosis and those without. Rather, the boundary is “imposed for practical reasons [rather 
than being] detected because it is in some respect objectively present”.10 Whereas people 
with a particular fuzzy kind are separated from those who do not have it (even if there are 
people who only partly have it), with practical kinds there is no clear separation between 
anyone with a practical kind and anyone without it. The place where a particular practical 
kind starts and ends is decided by psychiatrists rather than determined by the world.  
 Following Haslam's four different types of kinds, psychiatric diagnoses can clearly 
come in many forms. Which of these forms count as realist? Philosophers disagree about this 
matter. I consider two different realist accounts of natural kinds by philosophers of science 
and match them to Haslam's four different types of kinds. Brian Ellis developed a notion of 
natural kinds named scientific essentialism.11 According to Ellis, there are naturally forming 
entities in the world which have essential properties. All instances of a particular entity have 
the same properties so will be identical to each other. Additionally, since the essential 
properties of one entity are different to the essential properties of another entity those two 
entities form a natural demarcation in the world. This is roughly Haslam’s notion of 
essentialist natural kinds. Philosophically-informed psychiatrists Robert Kendell and Assen 
Jablensky took quite a similar position, arguing that valid psychiatric diagnosis have 
necessary and sufficient biological mechanisms, ones always present in that illness and not 
                                                          
7 Haslam, Nick, ‘Kinds of Kinds: A Conceptual Taxonomy of Psychiatry Categories’, Philosophy, Psychiatry 
and Psychology 9, no.13 (2002): 212. 
8 Ibid, 210. 
9 Ibid, 208. 
10 Ibid, 214. 
11 Brian Ellis, Scientific Essentialism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 22. 
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present in other illness. Any psychiatric diagnosis not meeting these criteria will be 
arbitrary.12 Down's syndrome is one of the few psychiatric diagnoses to fit essentialist natural 
kinds, each individual with Down's syndrome having a specific underlying cause and 
everyone without Down's syndrome lacking that specific underlying cause.  
 A more popular realist account of natural kinds in philosophy of psychiatry employs 
Richard Boyd’s homeostatic cluster kind approach. In this account there are causal 
mechanisms in nature which then produce clustering sets of characteristics. “The natural 
definition of one of these homeo-static property cluster kinds is determined by the members 
of a cluster of often co-occurring properties and by the ("homeo-static") mechanisms that 
bring about their co-occurrence”.13 This position differs from Ellis’ scientific essentialism on 
two grounds. Firstly, there is no requirement that the homeostatic mechanisms are 
essentialist. Not every mechanism will be present in all cases of the disorder. Secondly, the 
characteristics produced by these mechanisms need not form into discrete bundles. Some 
homeostatic property cluster kinds will be sharply demarcated from other homeostatic 
property cluster kinds, but not all will be. Boyd’s account fits Haslam’s account of discrete 
kinds and fuzzy kinds. Homeostatic mechanisms can produce groupings of symptoms which 
are closely correlated, the symptoms being either present or absent in an individual, and thus 
produce discrete kinds. However, sometimes homeostatic mechanisms produce groupings of 
symptoms which occur together in a looser, more irregular fashion, the symptoms only being 
partially present in some individuals, and thus produce fuzzy kinds. Many philosophers of 
psychiatry employ Boyd's account of natural kinds.14  
I now bring together Haslam's four types of kinds with these two realist notions of 
kinds. Haslam’s essentialist natural kinds fit Ellis’ scientific essentialism, providing an 
essentialist realist position. This is realist because the world determines how the groupings of 
symptoms go together. Haslam’s discrete kinds and fuzzy kinds fit Boyd’s Homeostatic 
cluster kind position. These could be seen as non-essentialist realist positions. Though not an 
essentialist position, the world still determines how the groupings of symptoms go together. 
This is typically thought to make them realist but I will look at arguments which challenge 
realist understandings of discrete and fuzzy kinds below. Finally, Haslam’s practical kinds fit 
neither Ellis’s or Boyd’s account. Psychiatrists, rather than the world, determine the 
boundaries of practical kinds. This means they do not fit the two most popular approaches to 
realism employed by philosophers of psychiatry and therefore practical kinds would be 
considered an anti-realist position.  
Essentialist natural kinds are realist and practical kinds are anti-realist under the most 
common approaches in philosophy of psychiatry. In what follows I focus on the more 
problematic fuzzy and discrete kinds. I consider an argument which would suggest that fuzzy 
kinds are actually anti-realist then I consider another argument which would suggest that both 
fuzzy and discrete kinds are actually anti-realist. 
                                                          
12 Robert Kendell and Assen Jablensky, 'Distinguishing between the validity and utility of psychiatric 
diagnosis', American Journal of Psychiatry 35, (2003): 9. 
13 Richard Boyd, 'Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds', Philosophical Studies 
61, (1991): 141. 
14 Helen Beebee and Nigel Sabbarton-Leary, 'Are Psychiatric Kinds 'Real'?', The European Journal of 
Analytical Philosophy 6 no.1, (2010): 23; Kenneth S Kendlar, Peter Zachar and Carl Craver, 'What kinds of 
things are psychiatric disorders?', Psychological Medicine 41, (2011): 1146; Murphy, Natural Kinds, 120; 
Jonathan Tsou, 'Natural Kinds, Psychiatric Classification and the History of the DSM', History of Psychiatry 




2.1 Are psychiatric diagnoses part of the metaphysical structure of the world? 
 
Essentialist kinds and discrete kinds have clear boundaries in comparison to non-essentialist 
and non-discrete kinds. Something either is or is not a particular essentialist or discrete kind. 
Therefore, they seem part of the metaphysical structure of the world since that metaphysical 
structure seems to determine their boundaries. In contrast, fuzzy kinds do not have discrete 
boundaries. For any given fuzzy kind, there will be individuals who definitely are that fuzzy 
kind, individuals who are definitely not that fuzzy kind but there are also individuals who are 
partly that fuzzy kind. This raises the danger that psychiatrists need to make a decision about 
who is included in membership of that fuzzy kind. Therefore, the boundaries of the fuzzy 
kind are not solely determined by the metaphysical structure but also by psychiatrists. This is 
especially worrying for a realist psychiatry if Haslam is correct to claim that fuzzy kinds are 
more common in psychiatry than essentialist natural kinds and discrete kinds.15 
A related problem is co-morbidity. This is where an individual is given multiple 
diagnoses. This situation can be very common. For example, many autistic individuals also 
meet the criteria for other diagnosis. Around 45% of autistic individuals meet clinical criteria 
for depression and 40% meet clinical criteria for anxiety. It is not obviously clear whether 
this means the individual should be given three different diagnosis or if they should just be 
diagnosed with autism but the symptoms of autism should also cover the symptoms of 
depression and anxiety. This suggests the world itself does not determine the boundaries of 
psychiatric diagnosis but rather psychiatrists must make this decision, which would make 
fuzzy kinds metaphysically anti-realist.  
Realists can respond by adopting a pluralistic realism. There are real groupings of 
behaviours in the mind-independent structure of the world. Therefore, a psychiatric diagnosis 
which describes that behaviour is describing something real, even if there is more than one 
way psychiatrists can describe that real behaviour.16 For example, the symptoms associated 
with autism are real; additionally, they group together in reality. Despite this, it is still an 
open question if psychiatrists should just employ autism, should instead employ autism and 
Asperger’s syndrome or use autism, Asperger’s syndrome and even more subtypes.17 The 
realist would claim all these options are ways of describing the real world, making each 
option a realist psychiatric diagnosis. This does, however, raise concerns that psychiatric 
diagnoses are only real in a very loose sense. The behaviour exhibited by patients might be 
part of the metaphysical structure of the world, but it seems that the opinions of psychiatrists 
are required to formulate fuzzy kinds, meaning that determining fuzzy kinds involves 
something more than just the metaphysical structure of the world. Fuzzy kinds seem to sit 
between essentialist and discrete kinds, which have clear boundaries of symptoms, and 
practical kinds, which have their boundaries determined by psychiatrists rather than the 
world. This leaves the metaphysical status of fuzzy kinds unclear.  
                                                          
15 Nick Haslam, 'Natural Kinds in Psychiatry: Conceptually Implausible, Empirically Questionable, and 
Stigmatizing', in Classifying Psychopathology, eds. Harold Kincaid and Jacqueline A Sullivan 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2014), 23. 
16 Rachel Cooper, Psychiatry and the Philosophy of Science (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007), 50. 
17 This example reflects the difference between DSM-IV and DSM-5. DSM-IV included the diagnoses of 




2.2 Are mechanisms part of the metaphysical structure of the world? 
 
Essentialist kinds are realist because they have underlying essentialist mechanisms, that is, a 
mechanism which is present in every instance of the kind and not present elsewhere. Under 
this approach the world determines the boundaries of the mechanism and therefore also 
determines the boundaries of the essentialist kind. Discrete and fuzzy kinds are taken as real 
because they have homeostatic mechanisms. However, I now discuss the possibility that 
homeostatic mechanisms are determined not by the world but by the views of psychiatrists. 
This would in turn mean that discrete and fuzzy kinds are determined by the views of 
psychiatrists rather than the world and so would not be realist.  
 Homeostatic mechanisms might be demarcated on the views of psychiatrists rather 
than the metaphysical structure of the world because diverse causes can produce a 
homeostatic mechanism. For example, species continue to have relatively similar 
characteristics due to the homeostatic mechanism of the exchange of genes during mating, 
however, the exact same genes will not be transmitted in each instance of mating. Therefore, 
one homeostatic mechanism, the breeding habits of a particular species, will contain much 
causal diversity, specifically, different genes being transmitted in any particular instance of 
two animals of that species mating. Philosophers of psychiatry are rarely clear about the 
degree of causal diversity that can be present before a homeostatic mechanism stops being 
demarcated by the metaphysical structure of the world and is instead demarcated by the views 
of psychiatrists. I shall first discuss the current evidence of causal diversity in psychiatry then 
discuss the philosophical issues this raises. 
 Prominent psychiatrists David Kupfer, Michael First & Darrel Regier write that “not 
one laboratory marker has been found to be specific in identifying any of the DSM-defined 
syndromes. Epidemiologic and clinical studies have shown extremely high rates of co-
morbidity among the disorders, undermining the hypothesis that the syndromes represent 
distinct etiologies”.18 Philosophically-informed psychiatrist Kenneth Kendler writes that “our 
genes seem neither to have read DSM-IV nor to particularly respect the diagnostic boundaries 
it established”.19 Psychiatry has uncovered very few mechanisms responsible for currently-
employed diagnoses and modern psychiatric evidence suggests there might not be many 
essentialist or homeostatic mechanisms out there waiting to be found. Rare instances of 
identifying big, simple causes are unlikely to be replicated.20 Stronger causes are easier to 
find, such as genes which are relatively common in individuals with a particular diagnosis 
being easier to find than genes which occur very rarely within that diagnosis.21 Additionally, 
causation in psychiatry often does not work in the manner of one cause one effect. Often, the 
same cause can result in many different outcomes whilst different causes can result in the 
same outcome.  
                                                          
18 David J Kupfer, Micheal B First and Darrel A Regier, A Research Agenda for DSM-V (Washington: 
American Psychiatric Association, 2002), xvii. 
19 Kenneth S Kendler, 'Advances in Our Understanding of Genetic Risk Factors for Autism Spectrum 
Disorders' American Journal of Psychiatry 167, n.11 (2010): 1291. 
20 Kenneth S Kendler, 'Towards a Philosophical Structure for Psychiatry', American Journal of Psychiatry 162, 
(2005): 434. 
21 Kenneth S Kendler, '“A Gene for…”: The Nature of Gene Action in Psychiatric Disorders', American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 162 (2005): 1247. 
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  Are such levels of causal heterogeneity compatible with homeostatic mechanisms or 
not? Unfortunately, very few philosophers define in detail what exactly constitutes a 
homeostatic mechanism. Consider that, for example, autism is currently being linked to 
hundreds of genes. Do hundreds of possible genes, only some of which will be present in any 
autistic person and many of which can be found in non-autistic people, count as a 
mechanism? An alternative approach to mechanisms focuses on developmental pathways, 
whereby lots of different causes (such as the presence of some of those hundreds of genes 
linked to autism) can set off a process. This process would be the homeostatic mechanism 
that causes autism. Therefore, a psychiatric diagnosis could have a single underlying 
homeostatic mechanism even if an immense variety of causal factors determine if that 
homeostatic mechanism actually is present. However, current evidence suggests many 
different causal pathways can produce grouping of symptoms. For example, Sun et al22 found 
24 possible causal pathways which can lead to schizophrenia. Does this mean schizophrenia 
has twenty-four different homeostatic cluster kind mechanisms and therefore should be split 
into twenty four different diagnoses, or does each of those pathways count as part of one 
bigger homeostatic cluster kind mechanism? Philosophers of psychiatry appealing to cluster 
kind mechanisms have generally not discussed such matters and those who have discussed 
this often disagree. 
 All this raises concerns that the metaphysical structure of reality in psychiatry might 
not consist of homeostatic mechanisms. Discrete kinds and fuzzy kinds are considered realist 
because they have real mechanisms; however, if homeostatic mechanisms are things which 
psychiatrists demarcate, rather than existing in the metaphysical structure of the world, then 
discrete kinds and fuzzy kinds would not be realist. Either there needs to be substantially 
stronger causes out there which have not yet been discovered, though there is reason to doubt 
this possibility, or realist philosophers of psychiatry need develop their position if they wish 
to avoid metaphysical anti-realism.  
 
 
3.0 Epistemic realism and anti-realism 
 
The second realist concern is epistemic realism. Scientific realism also requires the “The 
Epistemic Thesis: Mature and predicatively successful scientific theories are well confirmed 
and approximately true of the world”.23 These are epistemic questions about how much we 
can know about the metaphysical structure of the world. An epistemic realist believes that 
scientific theories correctly describes the mind-independent structure. An epistemic realist 
believes there is something that a particular scientific theory could describe and that it 
describes it correctly. In contrast, an epistemic anti-realist doubts that scientific theories 
correctly describe the world. An epistemic anti-realist might be a metaphysical realist, 
believing there is something that a particular scientific theory could describe, but doubts that 
scientific theories accurately describe that part of the world. For example, an epistemic realist 
in physics might believe the metaphysical structure of the world contains particles and 
believe that our theories about electrons correctly describe some sub-atomic particles. In 
contrast, an epistemic anti-realist might accept that sub-atomic particles exist but might also 
                                                          
22 Jingchun Sun, Peilin Jia, Anyman H Fanous, Edwin van den Oord, Xiangning Chen, Brien P Riley, Richard 
L Amdur, Kenneth S Kendler and Zhongming Zhao, 'Schizophrenia Gene Networks and Pathways and Their 
Application for Novel Candidate Gene Selection', Plos One 5, no.6 (2010): 5. 
23 Psillos, Structure of Nature, 4 emphasis original. 
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believe our theories about electrons do not accurately describe the real sub-atomic particles. It 
might be the case that we group different types of sub-atomic particles under the name 
electrons. In reality, the sub-atomic particles are actually different, having different 
properties, but physicists mistakenly believe they are all the same sub-atomic particle which 
we name electrons.24 
 Typically, epistemic realism and epistemic anti-realism are theory specific; few 
philosophers adopt scientific realism regarding all scientific theories or adopt anti-realism 
regarding all scientific theories. Modern scientific theories differ in how speculative they are 
and how much they are supported by evidence. An epistemic realist about a particular 
psychiatric diagnosis believes it substantially describes the metaphysical structure of the 
world; an epistemic anti-realist about a particular diagnosis doubts this. As with scientific 
theories, it is possible to be realist about some psychiatric diagnosis and not others. 
 Questions of epistemic realism have been long studied within philosophy of science. 
These are general arguments that can be applied to all sciences. Since psychiatry is typically 
considered a science I will apply these general arguments to psychiatry. Having done this, I 
will then look at epistemic issues which are specific to psychiatry.  
 
 
3.1 Epistemic arguments in philosophy of science 
 
The main argument for scientific realism within philosophy of science is known as the no 
miracles argument. This argument points to the incredible predictive success of scientific 
theories. Some scientific theories, especially in physics, are capable of making immensely 
accurate predictions. The argument goes that there are only two possible ways scientific 
theories are capable of making such predictions: either the theory correctly describes the 
world or a miracle has occurred. Since miracles are not allowed in philosophy the only 
explanation is that scientific theories correctly (or very nearly correctly) describe the world. 
The no miracles argument is rarely applied to psychiatry, including by philosophers of 
psychiatry. It is not easy to apply to psychiatry since examples of miracle like predictions are 
rare in psychiatry. It can, however, be applied in a more minimal form. If a particular 
psychiatric diagnosis were considered successful then it seems reasonable to suppose that the 
diagnosis is making at least some partially accurate claims about the world. A successful 
psychiatric diagnosis might be one which significantly helps predict how people with the 
diagnosis will act and helps with understanding why they do so. However, it is unclear just 
what degree of success would be required for this argument to work. Additionally, if a 
psychiatric diagnosis were considered successful this would only entail that it makes at least 
some partially accurate claims about the world but the exact degree of accuracy would not be 
clear.  
  I now discuss three arguments for epistemic anti-realism found in the philosophy of 
science, starting with the pessimistic meta-induction. Throughout history scientists have 
believed in theories, often on extremely good evidence, which turned out false, suggesting 
                                                          
24 Note that it is possible to be a metaphysical anti-realist but also an epistemic realist. A philosopher might 
think there is no one true structure for science to describe yet still thinks scientific theories can be assessed 
for the level of belief they deserve. For example, an epistemic realist might think simple theories are 
preferable to complicated theories and so use simplicity as a standard to judge which theories merit belief. 
They would only be epistemic realist over simple theories even though, by being metaphysical anti-realists, 
they are not willing to claim that the nature of reality itself is simple.  
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good evidence is insufficient for belief and our current theories will turn out false. Past and 
potential future changes suggest modern psychiatric diagnoses are on shaky ground and are 
likely to change. This likelihood of being abandoned undermines reliable belief in them. 
Arguments similar to these are common in philosophy of psychiatry, with regular complaints 
that psychiatric diagnoses keep changing. It is unclear why psychiatric diagnosis keep being 
revised if they are already correct. There are concerns that these changes are driven by the 
arbitrary views of psychiatrists rather than scientific evidence. Additionally, advances in 
genetics and neuroscience may mean we abandon major diagnosis like schizophrenia and 
manic depression. Past and potential future changes are often taken to suggest current 
psychiatric diagnoses do not merit belief.  
 Another argument from philosophy of science is underdetermination. This is where 
two different theories can equally well explain the evidence; therefore there is no justification 
for assigning belief to one theory rather than the other. If more than one theory is equally 
compatible with the evidence then scientists cannot employ evidence to decide which theory 
is correct. Related arguments in philosophy of psychiatry are common, with the suggestion 
that current psychiatric diagnoses are just one way of classifying mentally ill people. Murphy 
writes, “what evidence do we have that current practice in psychiatry produces good 
outcomes, outcomes that couldn't be matched by alternative nosologies that start from a 
completely different set of premises?”.25 The possibility of constructing alternative 
psychiatric diagnoses is taken to suggest we lack reason to believe current psychiatric 
diagnoses are the correct ones.  
  A third philosophy of science argument concerns the theory-laden nature of evidence. 
This is where evidence employed to construct scientific theories itself partly depends upon 
scientific theories, potentially mistaken ones, which can result in substantial negative 
epistemic consequences. This also has parallels in philosophy of psychiatry, it being 
commonly argued that psychiatric diagnoses are overly reliant upon false theories. There are 
many competing theoretical approaches to mental illness, such as psychoanalysis, cognitive 
psychology, neuroscience and genetics. Not only are we unsure which theory is correct, 
potentially many of them are false. If so, theories might cause psychiatrists to make false 
observations, theory influencing and thus distorting the observations used to form diagnoses. 
Reliance upon false theories undermines belief in existing psychiatric diagnoses. 
  I believe that these arguments are best judged by historical studies. The strength of the 
pessimistic meta-induction is based upon establishing how greatly a psychiatric diagnosis 
undergo change in criteria across their history. Underdetermination arguments are best judged 
by comparing modern diagnosis to actual historical diagnoses which have stood the test of 
being applied to real patients rather than to undeveloped hypothetical alternatives. Theory-
laden nature of evidence arguments are also best judged by studying if psychiatrists in the 
past, who often held very different theories to modern psychiatrists, reported different 
symptoms or clustered symptoms together in a different manner.  
 
 
3.2 Epistemic arguments in philosophy of psychiatry 
 
I now consider epistemic arguments in philosophy of psychiatry. These are arguments 
discussed by philosophers of psychiatry which deal with issues specific to psychiatry rather 
than being arguments applicable to all sciences. 
                                                          
25 Dominic Murphy, Psychiatric in the Scientific Image (Cambridge: MIT Press) 10. 
11 
  There are many epistemic issues over neuroscience. For example, there are concerns 
that the dominant causal theory of schizophrenia since the 1970s, the dopamine hypothesis, is 
mistaken and should be abandoned. These issues are important because neuroscience is often 
taken as the most likely place to find the mechanisms underlying essentialist, discrete and 
fuzzy kinds. There is debate over whether neuroscience is ready for finding mechanisms 
underlying psychiatric illness. Some philosophers think neuroscience is ready whereas other 
consider neuroscience to be insufficiently developed. Additionally, even when sufficiently 
developed, employing neuroscience to understand the multiplicity of causal factors will be 
very difficult, raising epistemic concerns that mechanisms are incorrectly described or one 
mechanism is unrealistically emphasised over other mechanisms. 
  There are many epistemic concerns over how well psychiatrists describe the 
symptoms of patients. Phenomenologists are concerned that psychiatrists use relatively basic 
understanding of symptoms which does not convey the complexity of subjective experience. 
Also, there are often relatively weak links between symptoms and underlying neurology, 
since symptoms often involves non-neuroscientific factors like social environments. This 
creates epistemic issues over knowing the degree to which a neuroscientific or non-
neuroscientific understanding is required. 
  There are also epistemic issues related to non-scientific interests influencing scientific 
research. For instance, the insurance industry and drug manufacturers could influence 
psychiatric researchers to consciously or unconsciously interpret results to suit their interests 
rather than just describe the world.  
  Some philosophers have believed that patients will respond to different drugs because 
they have different underlying mechanisms, therefore drug responses help establish which 
patients share underlying causes.26 However, drugs typically only affect individual symptoms 
and typically affect individuals with different psychiatric diagnosis, making drugs 
epistemologically unreliable for demarcating psychiatric diagnosis. 
  There are epistemic concerns that psychiatric diagnosis distracts psychiatrist’s 
attention away from other aspects of the patient. There are concerns that many important 
aspects which influence how the patients behave, such as their upbringing, their socio-
economic environment and their personality are largely ignored. These factors could 
significantly cause mental distress but they are not typically considered medical factors. For 
example, if an individual is depressed because they have poor housing then the obvious 
solution would be to provide them with better housing rather than send them to a psychiatrist. 
Epistemic issues arise when such factors are ignored due to focusing excessively upon their 
psychiatric diagnosis.  
  Overall, philosophers of psychiatry are on balance epistemic anti-realists. They are 
generally concerned that currently employed psychiatric diagnosis are flawed and could be 
improved to better describe reality. They vary in the degree to which they believe psychiatric 






                                                          
26 Jonathan Y Tsou, 'Intervention, causal reasoning, and the neurobiology of mental disorders: Pharmacological 
drugs as experimental instruments', Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical 
Sciences' 43, (2012): 546. 
12 
Psychiatrists want psychiatric diagnoses to describe something real, rather than something in 
the minds of psychiatrists. This would help ensure the diagnosis actually describes what the 
patient is like and help the development of better treatments.  
 Realism has two components, the metaphysical and the epistemic. Most philosophers 
of psychiatry are metaphysical realists, believing there is a mind-independent structure of 
natural kinds for psychiatric diagnosis to describe. Natural kinds are typically taken as having 
boundaries of symptoms and mechanisms which are demarcated by the world. However, if, 
as I have argued, psychiatrists need make choices when drawing the boundaries of symptoms 
and if the immense causal diversity underlying psychiatry mean mechanisms are demarcated 
by psychiatrists then notions of realist psychiatric diagnosis are challenged. Finally, many 
philosophers of psychiatry are epistemic anti-realists, believing most currently employed 
psychiatric diagnoses fail to accurately describe the world. 
 The realism debate over psychiatric diagnosis has important consequences. If realism 
is justified, then the world largely or entirely determines what the correct psychiatric 
diagnosis are. In contrast, if anti-realism is justified then psychiatrists need decide which 
psychiatric diagnosis to employ since there is no one correct set of psychiatric diagnosis. If 
so, then psychiatrists need consider and debate what they want psychiatric diagnosis to be 
like. For example, they need decide whether they want to employ lots of diagnosis, each of 
which provides a quite specific description of patients, or if they want to employ a smaller 
number of diagnosis, each of which is applicable to a wider range of individuals. Thus anti-
realism over psychiatric diagnosis entails that there should be a debate over how to formulate 
psychiatric diagnosis. This debate need not take place if metaphysical and epistemic realism 
over psychiatric diagnosis were justified, meaning psychiatry had found the one correct set of 
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